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RESTITUTION -

1960 TENNESSEE SURVEY

WILLIAM WICKER*
I. LIABILITY OF ESTATE FOR BURIAL EXPENSES

II.

CONTRIBUTION-UNINTENTIONAL TORTFEASORS

Only two Tennessee restitution decisions were reported in the
Southwestern Reporter during the year covered by this survey.
One involves a question as to the liability of an intestate's estate for
burial expenses which were not ordered by either the administrator
or the sole heir and next of kin. The other involves a question concerning indemnity or contribution as between unintentional tortfeasors who were guilty of different degrees of negligence.
I. LIABILITY OF ESTATE FOR BURIAL EXPENSES

A claim for burial expenses always arises after the death of the
decedent and usually before discovery of a will or the appointment
of a personal representative. Reasonable burial expenses are proper
charges against the estate, provided the funeral arrangements are
made by an appropriate person, and not by an officious interloper.'
Public decency and welfare require a reasonably prompt burial of
the dead. If an appropriate person made the funeral arrangements,
the personal representative is under an enforceable duty to pay the
reasonable cost of the funeral, even though he was not the one who
made the arrangements and refuses to pay voluntarily. The obligation
of the personal representative to pay is quasi-contractual; it is not
based upon any promise or assent. There are two exceptions to the
general rule that the estate is liable for reasonable funeral expenses:
one involves the officious intermeddler rule; the other, the rule that
there is no legal obligation to pay for a benefit voluntarily conferred
as a gift.2
In Johnson v. Hailey3 decedent died intestate in Obion County, leaving as his sole heir and next of kin his son, a member of the Atlanta
Bar. At the request of the decedent's brother, a local undertaker
provided the casket, the vault and other necessary articles and services
for the burial. Decedent's brother sent a telegram to the son, who
was then in Michigan, advising him of the time of the funeral. The
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son arrived shortly before the services and made no objections to
the funeral arrangements. It was held that the decedent's brother
was not an interloper, and that the estate was liable to the undertaker
for charges which were reasonable and not out of proportion to the
size of the estate, even though the charges exceeded the amount called
for by decedent's burial certificate.
This decision is sound. There was no intention on anyone's part
to make a gift. Decedent's brother was clearly an appropriate person
to take charge of the emergency and to arrange for the funeral,
since decendent's son was a non-resident and was in a distant state
at the time of the death.
II. CONTRIBUTION-UNINTENTIONAL TORTFEASORS
We turn now to the question of contribution between unintentional
tortfeasors. According to the Restatement4 and a majority of the
cases, 5 where a tort resulting in an injury to a third party is caused
by the negligence of both the plaintiff and defendant, the plaintiff
can recover no contribution from defendant, his joint tortfeasor, even
though he has had to pay the full amount of the damages to the third
party. This majority rule, denying contribution where the entire loss
has fallen on one of two tortfeasors both of whom are equally but
unintentionally responsible, often produces inequitable results. The
courts of Tennessee apparently follow the better but minority view
and allow contribution between tortfeasors where both are equally
responsible for an injury resulting from their concurrent negligent
6
acts.
The recent Tennessee case of Sherman White & Co. v. Long7 involves the issue of contribution or indemnity between unintentional
tortfeasors where one is more negligent than the others. In that
case, a driver negligently ran his truck into the rear of the last car
of a two-mile line of automobiles temporarily blocked on account of
a blasting operation by contractors rebuilding the highway. The last
car was halted just over a rise in the highway and was not protected
by a warning sign or a flagman. The owner and the driver of the truck
compromised and paid personal injury claims resulting from the
collision, and then sued the highway contractor for indemnity. It was
held that neither the driver nor the truck owner could recover anything, as the driver's conduct in failing to maintain proper outlook,
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speed and control constituted "active negligence" precluding any right
of restitution, and the conduct of the contractor in failing to warn
of the stopped traffic by signs or a flagman was "passive negligence"
and was probably only remote negligence not a proximate cause of
the accident.
Even in jurisdictions where contribution between negligent tortfeasors is not generally allowed, either contribution or indemnity is
often allowed to a tortfeasor guilty of only "passive negligence"
against one guilty of "active negligence. 8 It is often difficult to distinguish between "active" and "passive" negligence. The decision in
the Long case illustrates the difficult and technical character of the
distinction. Basically both parties simply failed to realize and guard
against a dangerous situation created by a line of cars parked on a
road just beyond a rise in the highway. If the Tennessee courts have
in fact completely abandoned the unreasonable rule against contribution as between negligent tortfeasors, the Long case would seem to
be an appropriate one for contribution, though not indemnity, provided the negligence of the contractor was a "proximate" cause, as it
appears to the present writer to have been. Usually the active-passive
doctrine is significant only as an exception to the no contribution
rule. It is interesting to speculate as to what the decision would have
been if the contractor had paid the injured party and was seeking
indemnity or contribution against the driver and the owner of the
truck.
8. PRossER,
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